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Abstract 
We provide the first assessment of whether an intensification of product market competition 
reduces the racial wage gap exactly where taste-based theories predict that competition will 
reduce  labor  market  discrimination.  in  economies  where  employers  have  strong  racial 
prejudices. We use bank deregulation across the U.S. states to identify an intensification of 
competition among banks, which in turn lowered entry barriers facing nonfinancial firms, 
especially firms that depend heavily on bank credit. Consistent with taste-based theories, we 
find that competition boosted blacks’ relative residual wages within the banking industry and 
bank-dependent industries, but only in states with strong tastes for discrimination. 
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 R. Levine, A. Levkov and Y. Rubinstein, submitted 2010 White Americans receive much higher wages than their black counterparts (Altonji and
Blank, 1999; Donohue and Heckman, 1991; Fryer, 2011; Katz and Autor, 1999). Con-
sequently, a large literature examines the nature of the cognitive and noncognitive skill
di⁄erentials associated with these racial wage disparities.1 Rather than investigating
skills, we focus on the role of racial prejudices in contributing to the black-white wage
di⁄erential. We assess how racial prejudices interact with changes in product market
competition to shape the racial wage gap.
Our research is framed and structured by Becker￿ s (1957) taste-based theory of
discrimination, which suggests that intensi￿ed product market competition erodes the
manifestation of racial prejudices on labor market outcomes. In Becker￿ s framework,
labor market discrimination￿ the di⁄erence in wages between identically productive
black and white workers￿ is determined by the most racially prejudiced employer of
black workers. Therefore, intensi￿ed competition, by allowing employers with weaker
racial biases to enter the market, reduces labor market discrimination and shrinks the
racial wage gap, but only in markets where black workers were working for racially
biased employers. Although economists have separately examined the association be-
tween competition and the racial wage gap (e.g., Peoples and Talley, 2001) and that
between racial attitudes and the racial wage gap (Charles and Guryan, 2008), we take a
di⁄erent route. Recognizing the joint connections among competition, racial attitudes,
and labor market discrimination, we provide the ￿rst assessment of whether an inten-
si￿cation of competition reduces the racial wage gap in exactly those environments
in which the taste-based theory predicts that competition will reduce labor market
discrimination￿ in economies where pre-existing employers have strong racial preju-
dices. As we show, di⁄erentiating economies by racial prejudice is crucial for drawing
accurate inferences about the e⁄ect of competition on labor market outcomes.
In particular, we evaluate the causal impact of competition on the racial wage
gap while di⁄erentiating among U.S. state economies with stronger and weaker tastes
for discrimination. We use bank deregulation across the U.S. states to identify an
exogenous intensi￿cation of competition among banks and￿ more importantly￿ among
manufacturing and other non￿nancial ￿rms. From the mid-1970s to 1994, individual
states relaxed restrictions on the entry of banks from other states and the branching
of banks within states, boosting the contestability of banking markets. For example,
Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) show that deregulation narrowed interest rate spreads
1See, for example, Austin-Smith and Fryer (2005), Card and Krueger (1992), Carneiro, Heckman,
and Masterov (2005), Coate and Loury (1993), Fryer and Levitt (2004), Jencks (1998), Juhn, Murphy,
and Pierce (1993), Lang, Manove, and Dickens (2005), Neal (2007), and Neal and Johnson (1996).
1and bank pro￿t margins within deregulating states, without harming loan quality.
Moreover, state bank deregulation increased competition within the manufacturing
sector and across each state￿ s entire non￿nancial economy, i.e., bank deregulation af-
fected the overall economy, not just the banking sector. By intensifying competition
among banks, state deregulation spurred improvements in bank performance, as mea-
sured by lower lending rates and the development and adoption of better techniques for
screening borrowers (Jayaratne and Strahan, 1998; Hubbard and Palia, 1995). These
improvements, in turn, lowered barriers to the entry of new ￿rms. Black and Strahan
(2002) and Kerr and Nanda (2009) demonstrate that state bank deregulation substan-
tively increased new ￿rm entry within deregulating states. And, Cetorelli and Strahan
(2006) show that bank deregulation intensi￿ed competition more in bank-dependent
manufacturing industries￿ industries where ￿rms rely heavily on bank credit to ￿nance
capital expenditures and operations￿ than in industries that rely less on bank ￿nance.
We di⁄erentiate states by racial bias using several measures. From the 1970 U.S.
census, we compute the predicted rate of racial intermarriage based on individual
and state characteristics. We interpret the di⁄erence between the predicted rate of
intermarriage and the actual rate as positively related to the taste for discrimination.
Although imperfect, this index captures decisions made far before our sample period
since the 1970 census contains the accumulated stock of marriages in 1970 and we
begin our analyses in 1976. Furthermore, we con￿rm the results using survey-based
measures of racial attitudes from Charles and Guryan (2008).
We conduct three types of analyses to identify the impact of bank deregulation on
blacks￿relative residual wages and to shed light on the underlying causal mechanism.
We measure blacks￿relative residual wages as the di⁄erence between the wages of black
and white workers with the same Mincerian characteristics, working in the same state
and year, and￿ in some speci￿cations￿ employed in the same industry and occupation.
We ￿rst assess how bank deregulation a⁄ected blacks￿relative wages within the banking
industry by exploiting the cross-state, cross-time exogenous variation in the timing of
bank deregulation and di⁄erentiating states by racial bias.
Second, we examine manufacturing industries. Bank deregulation intensi￿ed com-
petition more in bank-dependent manufacturing industries than in other manufacturing
industries. Thus, we examine whether deregulation boosted blacks￿relative wages more
in bank-dependent industries within high racial bias states.
Third, we examine each state￿ s overall economy. With data on new incorporations
by state and year, we assess whether bank deregulation reduced a state￿ s overall racial
2wage gap by spurring the entry of new ￿rms, which is the key mechanism suggested
by the taste-based theory of discrimination. And, the state-wide analyses provide a
unique opportunity to evaluate the impact of deregulation and new ￿rm entry on the
racial wage gap in the overall economy, not just in speci￿c industries.
The ￿ndings suggest that intensi￿ed competition substantially increased the relative
demand for black workers but only in states with a su¢ ciently high degree of racial
bias. First, bank deregulation induced a sharp increase in blacks￿relative wages only in
states with a high degree of racial bias. These results hold when allowing blacks￿relative
wages to vary over time within each state, over time within the banking industry, and
across the banking industries of di⁄erent states.
Second, bank deregulation increased blacks￿relative wages more in bank-dependent
manufacturing industries, which are those manufacturing industries in which bank
deregulation intensi￿ed product market competition the most, but only in states with a
su¢ ciently high degree of racial bias. These results hold when allowing blacks￿relative
wages in manufacturing to vary over time within each state. Moreover, even when
allowing the relative wages of black workers within bank-dependent manufacturing
industries to vary over time by state, we still ￿nd that the racial wage gap within
a state￿ s bank-dependent manufacturing industries shrunk relative to the racial wage
gap within its other manufacturing industries following bank deregulation￿ but only in
high racial bias states. Thus, the impact of bank deregulation on the racial wage gap is
strongest exactly where the taste-based approach suggest it will be most pronounced￿
in the bank-dependent industries of high racial bias states.
Third, estimates for the overall economy con￿rm the negative association between
competition and the racial wage gap within high racial bias states. Using inter- and
intrastate bank deregulation as instrumental variables to identify exogenous shocks to
the rate of new incorporations, we ￿nd that increases in the rate of new incorporations
reduced the racial wage gap in high racial bias states. A ten percent increase in the
rate of new incorporations reduced the racial wage gap by 2.5 percentage points.
We also examine segregation. Becker￿ s (1957) theory predicts that when employ-
ers are heterogeneous in both quality and taste for discrimination, black workers will
be hired by employers with the weakest racial prejudices, creating segregation in the
workforce. A lowering of entry barriers that allows new employers with less of a taste
for discrimination to enter the market increases the employment opportunities of black
workers. Thus, if our ￿ndings on blacks￿relative wages re￿ ect the causal impact of
competition on how racial prejudices a⁄ect labor markets, then we should also observe
3greater integration following an intensi￿cation of competition.
We ￿nd that an exogenous increase in new incorporations reduced racial segregation
in high racial bias states. To proxy for segregation, we construct measures of the degree
to which each industry is disproportionately composed of white workers or run by white
managers. In high racial bias states, an increase in new incorporations sparked by bank
deregulation induced more blacks to work in historically "white" industries.
This paper￿ s ￿nding￿ that competition erodes the adverse e⁄ects of racial prejudices
on the relative demand for black workers, boosting blacks￿relative wages and promoting
workplace integration￿ is robust to several potentially confounding in￿ uences. First,
although deregulation could increase blacks￿relative wages by reducing the relative
supply of black workers, we ￿nd that increases in new incorporations boosted the
relative working hours of black workers in high racial bias states. Second, there is
no evidence that competition increased blacks￿relative wages by disproportionately
helping occupations and industries with a comparatively high proportion of blacks.
Third, we ￿nd no evidence that the results are driven by changes in the skill composition
of the labor force through the selection of workers into the labor force, interstate
migration, and changes in self-employment. Fourth, bank deregulation improved black
workers￿location throughout white workers￿residual wage distribution, indicating that
competition boosted blacks￿relative wages in particular, not the relative wages of
comparatively low income workers in general.
We are not the ￿rst to examine competition and discrimination, though much of this
research focuses on the gender wage gap. Oster (1975) compares market concentration
and the gender wage gap across industries, obtaining mixed results. Within the banking
industry, Black and Strahan (2001) show that bank deregulation reduced the gender
income gap. Within manufacturing, Black and Brainerd (2004) ￿nd that globalization
intensi￿ed competition and reduced the gender wage gap. Heywood and Peoples (1994)
and Peoples and Talley (2001) ￿nd that the deregulation of trucking increased the
relative wage rates of black workers. Focusing on integration, Ashenfelter and Hannan
(1986) ￿nd a negative association between market concentration and the share of female
employees across banking markets in Pennsylvania and New Jersey.
Our major contribution is that we provide the ￿rst evaluation of whether the impact
of an exogenous intensi￿cation of competition on both blacks￿relative wages and racial
integration varies positively with the economy￿ s taste for discrimination. That is, we
show that competition increased the relative demand for black workers more in those
environments in which the taste-based view of discrimination suggests that impact will
4be largest, i.e., in economies with a su¢ ciently high degree of racial bias and, within
those high racial bias economies, in industries that experience the largest intensi￿cation
of competition.2
Our work complements recent work on racial prejudices. Charles and Guryan (2008)
￿nd that a stronger taste for discrimination by the marginal ￿rm reduces blacks￿rel-
ative wage rates. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) show that potential employers
are more likely to request interviews based on resumes with "white" sounding names
than equivalent resumes with "black" sounding names. Rather than evaluating the
relation between racial prejudices and wages or job interviews, we examine the impact
of changes in competition on changes in relative wage rates.
Our work also contributes to a growing literature on the broader rami￿cations
of ￿nance (Levine, 2005). Speci￿cally, Beck, Levine, and Levkov (2010) show that
deregulation triggered improvements in the banking system that boosted the wages
of lower income workers. In this paper, we show that improvements in the banking
system exerted a particularly positive impact on the economic opportunities of black
workers by reducing the manifestation of racial prejudices in labor markets.
In what follows, Section 1 discusses bank deregulation as an exogenous source of
variation in competition. Section 2 describes the data and econometric design. Section
3 presents the results, and Section 4 provides robustness tests. Section 5 concludes.
1 Bank Deregulation and Competition
1.1 A Brief History of Bank Branch Deregulation
The history of geographic restrictions on banking￿ along with standard econometric
evidence￿ supports a key requirement of our estimation strategy: Namely, that bank
deregulation is exogenous to competition and blacks￿labor market outcomes. As de-
scribed by White (1982), geographic restrictions on banking protected local banks from
competition for much of the 20th century. By protecting ine¢ cient banks, geographic
restrictions created a powerful constituency for maintaining these regulations.
In the last quarter of the 20th century, however, technological, legal, and ￿nancial
innovations diminished the economic and political power of banks bene￿ting from ge-
2Furthermore, unlike much of the existing literature, our ￿ndings are not subject to Ashenfelter
and Hannan￿ s (1986) critique of industry-level studies. If labor is mobile across industries within a
state, then relative wages will primarily be established in the state￿ s overall economy, not in separate
industries. Under these conditions, it is crucial to examine both blacks￿relative wages in the state￿ s
overall economy and racial segregation.
5ographic restrictions. In particular, a series of innovations lowered the costs of using
distant banks. This reduced the monopoly power of local banks and weakened their
ability and desire to lobby for geographic restrictions. For example, the invention of
automatic teller machines (ATMs), in conjunction with court rulings that ATMs are
not bank branches, weakened the geographical link between banks and their clientele.
Furthermore, the creation of checkable money market mutual funds made banking by
mail and telephone easier, thus further weakening the power of local bank monopo-
lies. Finally, the increasing sophistication of credit scoring techniques, improvements
in information processing, and the revolution in telecommunications reduced the infor-
mational advantages of local bankers, especially with regards to small and new ￿rms.
These national developments interacted with preexisting state characteristics to
shape the timing of bank deregulation across the states. As shown by Kroszner and
Strahan (1999), deregulation occurred later in states where potential losers from dereg-
ulation (small, monopolistic banks) were ￿nancially stronger and had a lot of political
power. On the other hand, deregulation occurred earlier in states where potential
winners of deregulation (small ￿rms) were relatively numerous. Most states deregu-
lated geographic restrictions on banking between the mid-1970s and 1994, when the
Riegle-Neal Act e⁄ectively eliminated these restrictions.
Research also indicates that the forces driving bank deregulation were exogenous
to competition in the non-￿nancial sector and the racial wage gap. The timing of
deregulation was not shaped by new ￿rm formation (Black and Strahan, 2002, Kerr
and Nanda, 2009), the strength of labor unions (Black and Strahan, 2001), or the
degree of earnings inequality (Beck, Levine, and Levkov, 2010). Moreover, we show
below that the racial wage gap does not explain the timing of bank deregulation.
1.2 Bank Deregulation and Competition in the Banking and
Non-Financial Sectors
Bank deregulation increased competition within the banking sector by making it pos-
sible for banks to (a) open branches across markets within a state and (b) open sub-
sidiaries in other states. By increasing competition among banks, deregulation im-
proved banking sector performance. It reduced interest rates on loans, raised them on
deposits, lowered overhead costs, and shrunk the proportion of bad loans (Jayaratne
and Strahan, 1998). And, by enhancing the contestability of banking markets, dereg-
ulation expedited the development of better techniques for evaluating ￿rms (Hubbard
6and Palia, 1995).3
In boosting banking sector performance, bank deregulation spurred competition
in the non￿nancial sectors. Improvements in banking￿ lower lending rates, better
screening of borrowers, etc.￿ lowered ￿nancial barriers facing new ￿rms, intensifying
competition in the overall economy. Black and Strahan (2002) ￿nd that deregulation
helped entrepreneurs start new businesses, with the rate of new incorporations per
capita in a state increasing by six percentage points following deregulation. Kerr and
Nanda (2009) ￿nd that interstate deregulation increased the number of new start-ups
by six percentage points and expanded the number of facilities of existing ￿rms by four
percentage points. Kerr and Nanda (2009) also ￿nd a dramatic increase in both the
entry and exit of ￿rms, suggesting that deregulation increased contestability throughout
the economy. And, Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) show that bank deregulation had a
particularly big impact on lowering barriers to entry in bank-dependent industries,
which are industries in which ￿rms are naturally heavy users of bank ￿nance.
2 Data
In turning toward an assessment of the relationship between bank deregulation, com-
petition, and the racial wage gap, this section ￿rst describes the data on the (a) timing
of state bank deregulation, (b) competition in each state￿ s economy, (c) wages of black
workers relative to those of white workers with the same skills, and (d) measures of
racial attitudes at the state level.
2.1 State-level data on deregulation and competition
We obtain the dates of interstate and intrastate bank deregulation from Kroszner and
Strahan (1999) and Amel (2008). Most states removed these geographic restrictions
on banking between the mid-1970s and 1994, when they were eliminated by federal
legislation. The Annex, which is available on request, provides the deregulation dates
for each state.
3Hubbard and Palia (1995) show that (a) the country￿ s more innovative banks were developing
sophisticated credit-scoring techniques that improved the screening of new businesses and (b) deregu-
lation ￿by enhancing the contestability of banking markets ￿spurred the spread of these techniques.
By improving banking performance, deregulation lowered the barriers to new, non￿nancial ￿rms enter-
ing the market. Furthermore, deregulation fostered the formation of larger, geographically diversi￿ed
banks, potentially easing lending to smaller, more opaque ￿rms, as Berger et al. (1998) show that
small business lending increases after small banks are acquired.
7Since bank deregulation lowered entry barriers￿ and hence intensi￿ed competition￿
more in bank-dependent manufacturing industries than in other industries (Cetorelli
and Strahan, 2006), we assess whether bank regulation a⁄ected the racial wage gap
more in bank-dependent industries.
To measure bank-dependence, we follow Cetorelli and Strahan (2006). They note
that (a) industries di⁄er in their dependence on bank ￿nancing and (b) these di⁄erences
re￿ ect technological di⁄erences associated with the initial scale of the project, the
gestation period of the endeavor, the expected pattern of cash-￿ ows from the project,
and the likely demands for additional injections of capital. Thus, some industries are
heavily bank-dependent, such as Electronics and Chemical Equipment, while other
industries are less bank-dependent, such as Leather or Tobacco. In ￿nding that bank
deregulation lowers entry barriers more in bank-dependent industries, Cetorelli and
Strahan (2006) use the median ratio of bank loans to total ￿rm assets across ￿rms in
each industry to measure bank-dependence.4
Since the taste-based theory of discrimination focuses on the actual entry of new
￿rms, we use the rate of new incorporations to measure competition . Speci￿cally, we
use the log of new business incorporations per capita for each state over the period
1977-1994, where the new incorporations data are from Black and Strahan (2002), who
obtain them from Dun and Bradstreet.
2.2 Generating Relative Residual Wages
2.2.1 CPS Samples for the Years 1977 to 2007
Data on wages and worker characteristics are from the Integrated Public Use Microdata
Series (IPUMS) from the U.S. Current Population Survey (CPS, March Supplements
for the survey years 1977 to 2007). The CPS March Annual Demographic Supple-
ments provide information on earnings, along with weeks and hours worked in the
calendar year preceding the March survey so that the 1991 survey provides informa-
tion on earnings in 1990. We start in Survey year 1977 because that is when the CPS
4Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) use data from the 1998 Survey of Small Business Finance. Specif-
ically, manufacturing industries with above the median levels of bank dependence are: (1) furniture
and ￿xtures, (2) stone, clay, glass, and concrete products, (3) printing and publishing, (4) primary
metal industries, (5) lumber and wood products, (6) rubber and plastic products, (7) paper and allied
products, petroleum and coal products, (8) textile mill products, and (9) chemical and allied products.
Those with below the median levels of bank dependence are: (1) leather and leather products, (2)
apparel and other textiles, (3) food and kindred products, (4) fabricated metal products, (5) mis-
cellaneous manufacturing, (6) instruments and related products, (7) transportation equipment, (8)
industrial machinery and equipment, and (9) electrical and electronic equipment.
8reports information on each person￿ s state of residence. To enhance comparability and
connect our analyses to the literature, we restrict our sample to non-Hispanic white
and black adult civilian males between the ages of 18 and 65 during the working year,
and exclude persons living in group quarters or with missing data on relevant demo-
graphics. Our main wage sample further excludes the self-employed, persons in the
military, agricultural, or private household sectors, persons with inconsistent reports
on earnings, and individuals with allocated earnings.
We classify the adult population into six educational categories: (i) persons with
0￿ 8 years of schooling completed; (ii) high school dropouts; (iii) high school graduates;
(iv) some college; (v) college graduate; and (vi) advanced degree. Potential work
experience is constructed as the maximum between zero and age (in year of survey)
minus years of schooling completed minus seven. Furthermore, in some speci￿cations,
we di⁄erentiate workers by industry and occupation. We use the three digit industry
and occupation codes from the CPS, which means including 408 additional dummy
variables each year (144 industries and 262 occupations).
Wage rates are de￿ned as real annual earnings divided by the product of weekly
working hours and annual working weeks. We use the Consumer Price Index to de￿ ate
earnings to 2000 dollars and set hourly earnings to missing if any of these components
is missing or zero. Following Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008), workers with top coded
earnings have their annual earnings set to 1.5 times the annual top-code amount. We
trim outliers with hourly wages below the 1st percentile and above the 97th percentile
of the year-speci￿c distribution of hourly earnings of full-time, full-year workers. This
trimming virtually eliminates individuals with top-coded annual earnings. The results
are robust to altering the de￿nition of outliers. Finally, in accord with previous research
on bank deregulation, we drop Delaware and South Dakota from our analyses due to
large concentration of credit card banks in these states. A detailed Annex, available
on request, provides more details on the construction of our sample.
2.2.2 Relative residual wages: Framework
We decompose the black-white wage di⁄erential into "explained" and "residual" com-
ponents. In particular, assume that log hourly wages for a white individual i in state
















where Xist represents individual characteristics associated with log hourly wages in
state s in year t, including Mincerian characteristics, such as education and experi-
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The "explained" component of the black-white wage di⁄erential is ￿Xst￿
W
t . It
represent the mean wage di⁄erential explained by the mean observed "skill" di⁄erential
between black and white workers ￿Xst, where these skill di⁄erences are valued or
"priced" using the returns that the average white worker gets for these skills (￿
W
t ).
The "residual" component, XB
st￿￿t, which we refer to as RBst for simplicity, is that
part of the mean black-white wage di⁄erential unaccounted for by mean skill di⁄er-
entials. The residual component represents the average wage gap between black and
white workers with identical characteristics that emerges because of racial di⁄erences




t ). Recall, these characteristics
include standard, observable Mincerian traits as well as unobservable di⁄erences in the
average productive characteristics of black and white workers at the state-year level.
Thus, RBst captures both the e⁄ects of labor market discrimination and unobserved
productivity di⁄erences between black and white workers. A large literature focuses
on identifying the role of these two sources. For example, Neal and Johnson (1996)
attribute much of the unexplained gap in wages to di⁄erences in cognitive abilities. In
this paper we focus on evaluating the e⁄ect of competition on labor market discrimi-
nation, i.e., the e⁄ect of competition on racial di⁄erences in the "prices" of skills. We
use the di⁄erential timing of bank deregulation across states, its di⁄erential impact on
industries, and di⁄erences in the taste for discrimination across states to identify the
10e⁄ect of competition on labor market discrimination against black workers.
2.2.3 Relative residual wages: Estimation
First we estimate equation (1) separately for each year.5 Then, employed with ￿
W
t ; we
compute residual wages (Rist) for all workers, white and black:
Rist = Wist ￿ ￿
W
t Xist; (4)
By construction, Rst for white workers equals zero in each state-year. For black workers
the average relative residual wage, RBst, can di⁄er from zero. Since Xist e⁄ectively
includes state-year e⁄ects (and state-industry-year e⁄ects in some speci￿cations), the
relative residual wages already account for state-year (or state-year-industry) e⁄ects
on white workers￿wages, including the e⁄ect of banking deregulation on the wage rates
of white workers.
In some of our analyses, we control for additional factors in equation (1) before
constructing residual wages in equation (4). Speci￿cally, we estimate the e⁄ect of bank
deregulation on black workers￿relative wages in the banking industry, in manufacturing
by the need for external ￿nance, and in the overall economy. In the banking analyses,
we introduce bank-year e⁄ects into equation (1) that condition out the impact of bank
deregulation on white workers￿wages in and outside of the banking industry. For the
manufacturing level analyses, we include dummy variables for whether the worker is
employed in a state￿ s manufacturing industries and whether the worker is employed in
a state￿ s bank-dependent industries by year.
By controlling for these wage rate determinants, we account for the impact of bank
deregulation on white workers￿wages. If bank deregulation a⁄ects wages but does
not a⁄ect labor market discrimination or the unobservable di⁄erences in the mean
productive characteristics of black and white workers in a state, then we should ￿nd
no association between deregulation and blacks relative residual wages.
Finally, rather than using this two-step procedure, we could have equivalently run
a single wage rate regression that includes su¢ cient interaction terms based on race,
year, state, and demographics to capture the attractive properties mentioned above.
5Given changes in the structure of wages in the United States since the mid 1970s (Katz and Autor,






to vary by year. This is crucial because
of the the well-documented skill gap between black and white workers. Failure to account for time-
varying returns to observables will lead to erroneous estimates of the dynamic pattern of relative
wages, potentially biasing our assessments.
11Although they yield the same results, the two-step approach is clearer and computa-
tionally faster.
2.3 Racial Bias Indexes
Throughout our analyses, we explicitly account for cross-state di⁄erences in the taste
for discrimination. This is both novel and essential to drawing accurate inferences
because competition should have a larger impact on blacks￿relative wages in states
with a greater taste for discrimination (all other things equal).
We develop two types of racial bias indexes based on the accumulated stock of
racial intermarriage in 1970. We use the 1970 Census to construct information on
the rate of racial intermarriage in each state (Form 1 State, and Form 2 State one-
percent samples). The Census samples are the largest microdata set containing detailed
marriage and demographic information. Our primary sample includes married whites
and blacks between the ages of 18 and 65, and excludes couples in which at least one
person is living in group quarter or has missing data on race, gender, state of residence,
marital status and educational attainment.
The "simple" racial bias index equals the di⁄erence between the rate of intermar-
riage that would exist if married people were randomly matched and the actual inter-
marriage rate. The random rate equals 2P ￿(1￿P), where P is the proportion of blacks
among the married population. Larger values of the simple racial bias index indicate
that intermarriage occurs less in practice than if marriage pairings were random. We
interpret larger values as (partially) re￿ ecting racial bias.
In the second type of racial bias index, we account for other factors that might
induce the actual rate of intermarriage to deviate from the random rate. Intermarriage
depends on the opportunities for interracial social contacts, so that the relative sizes
of the black-white populations might independently a⁄ect intermarriage (Blau, 1977).
Furthermore, since the odds of interethnic unions increase with couples￿educational
attainment (Massey and Denton, 1987; Qian, 1997; Rubinstein and Brenner, 2009), we
also control for education and age. Speci￿cally, based on the 1970s census, we estimate
the following equation for all married couples (excluding couples in which either the
husband or wife is neither white nor black) in the United States:
Iis = bHis + cWis + dSs + ￿is; (5)
where Iis equals one if couple i in state s is racially mixed and zero otherwise, His and
12Wis are vectors of age and education characteristics for the two spouses respectively,
Ss are state characteristics, ￿is is the unexplained component of intermarriage, while
b, c, and d are coe¢ cients. Our benchmark speci￿cation conditions on nine categories
of education, along with age entered as a quartic. For state characteristics, we in-
clude the random intermarriage rate de￿ned above along with the percentage of blacks
among married couples. We experimented with numerous speci￿cations, including and
excluding the random intermarriage rate and the percentage of blacks, changing the
speci￿cation of education and age controls, and conditioning on metropolitan and ur-
ban locations. These combinations produce the same conclusions.
From equation (5), we compute the intermarriage racial bias index for each state.
Let ￿s equal the average value of ￿is across couples in state s. Recognizing that
minf￿sg < 0, we compute the racial bias index as e Ts = ￿￿s + maxf￿sg, so that e Ts
equals zero for the state with the largest ￿s. We interpret large values as signaling a
stronger taste for discrimination. Appendix Table 1 provides the value of the racial
bias index, e Ts; for each state and the District of Columbia. Furthermore, Ts = 1 if
e Ts ￿ medianfe Tsg, and Ts = 0 if e Ts < medianfe Tsg.
The intermarriage racial bias index is positively correlated with survey-based mea-
sures of racial prejudice. Table 1 (Panel A) shows that the intermarriage racial bias
index is positively related to three survey-based measures of racial prejudice used by
Charles and Guryan (2008) in their study of relative wages and racial prejudices: (1)
the fraction of whites supporting a law against interracial marriage, (2) the fraction
of whites that would not vote for a black president, and (3) the fraction of whites
supporting the right to segregate neighborhoods by race. Thus, the racial bias index
based on intermarriage in 1970 is closely associated with subjective measures of racial
attitudes measured over the period 1972 to 2004.
The intermarriage racial bias index is negatively correlated with the relative wage
rates of black workers. Panel B of Table 1 shows that the intermarriage racial bias
index is strongly, negatively associated with blacks￿relative wage rates in the years
prior to both inter- and intrastate bank deregulation, suggesting that the racial bias
index captures cross-state di⁄erences in the relative demand for black workers. The
negative relation between the intermarriage racial bias index and blacks￿relative wages
is robust to controlling for the supply of blacks in the workforce as shown in Panel B of
Table 1. Consistent with Becker￿ s (1957) theory, states in which black workers compose
ten percent or more of the labor force tend to have lower relative wage rates for black
workers than other states, but the racial bias index remains negatively and signi￿cantly
13associated with blacks￿relative wages.
We also use the Charles and Guryan (2008) survey-based estimates of the degree
of racial prejudice of the marginal ￿rm in each state to categorize high- and low-racial
bias states. As shown in Panel B of Table 1, states with above the median levels
of this marginal racial prejudice indicator have signi￿cantly lower relative wages of
black workers. Nonetheless, the racial bias index based on racial intermarriage remains
negatively and signi￿cantly associated with blacks￿relative wages even when controlling
for the marginal racial prejudice indicator and when controlling for both the marginal
racial prejudice indicator and the proportion of blacks in the workforce.
For the purposes of this paper, there are advantages to using the intermarriage
racial bias index rather than survey-based measures of racial attitudes, though we
draw consistent conclusions with either racial bias indicator. The intermarriage racial
bias index is based on actual choices made prior to deregulation not survey responses
made during the period of deregulation. Moreover, our empirical strategy requires that
the measure of racial bias is invariant to bank deregulation and the resultant change
in competition. If we di⁄erentiate states based on a measure of racial bias that itself
re￿ ects the e⁄ects of deregulation on the relative demand and supply of black workers,
this will confound our strategy of identifying the causal impact of product market
competition on the relative demand for black workers. The racial attitude surveys,
however, are conducted during the period of bank deregulation. Furthermore, unlike
Charles and Guryan (2008), we do not want to measure the racial preferences of the
marginal employer. This will incorporate in￿ uences of both the relative demand for and
supply of black workers. Rather, theory predicts that an intensi￿cation of competition
will increase the relative demand for black workers and hence boost blacks￿relative
wages in states with a su¢ ciently high taste for discrimination, while holding the
relative supply of black workers ￿xed. We test this.
In summary, we evaluate whether an exogenous increase in competition boosts the
relative demand for black workers more in states with larger values of the racial bias
indices. Measuring racial bias with error will bias the results against ￿nding statistically
signi￿cant results. We do not require that the racial bias measures are perfect; rather,
we simply require that they provide information on racial prejudices across states.
143 Results
3.1 Preliminaries
Our empirical analyses rest on the assumption that the racial wage gap did not shape
the cross-state timing of both interstate and intrastate bank deregulation. As discussed
above, Kroszner and Strahan￿ s (1999) study of the causes of these banking reforms
stresses the interaction between technological innovation and the preexisting structure
of banking markets, not attitudes toward race. To assess this timing issue further, we
graph the relationship between the racial wage gap and the timing of deregulation.
Figure 1 shows that neither the level of the racial wage gap before deregulation
(Panels A and B) nor its rate of change prior to deregulation (Panels C and D) explains
cross-state di⁄erences in the timing of interstate or intrastate bank deregulation, where
the size of the "bubbles" represents the size of the black workforce in each state. There
is no evidence that the racial wage gap in￿ uences the timing of bank deregulation.
3.2 Bank Deregulation and Blacks￿Relative Wages: Banking
We begin by assessing the impact of bank deregulation on blacks￿relative wages within
the banking industry, while di⁄erentiating between high and low racial bias states.
As noted above, bank deregulation intensi￿ed competition among banks. Thus, in
evaluating the relationship between competition and racial discrimination, it is natural
to ￿rst test whether bank deregulation boosted the relative wages of black workers
within the banking industry.
The dependent variable is the residual wage gap (Rist), which is estimated in the
spirit of equation (4). In particular, we estimate a Mincerian wage equation for white
workers, separately for each year, while also including state ￿xed e⁄ects and a dummy
variable that equals one if the worker is employed within a speci￿c state￿ s banking in-
dustry. Since this is estimated separately for each year, we allow for (1) state-year ￿xed
e⁄ects, (2) bank-year ￿xed e⁄ects, and (3) the coe¢ cients on the Mincerian character-
istics to vary by year. We use the estimated coe¢ cients and the actual characteristics
of all workers to construct the residual wage gap for white and black workers. By con-
struction, the residual wage gap for white workers sums to zero (a) within a state-year
and (b) within and outside of the banking industry in each state-year.
To evaluate the impact of bank deregulation on blacks￿relative wages, we estimate
the following OLS equation:
15Rist = ￿[Dst ￿ BNKi ￿ Bi] + ￿BNK;B;s + ￿BNK;B;t + ￿B;s;t + ￿ist; (6)
where Dst equals one when state s in year t has deregulated interstate banking, BNKi
equals one if individual i works in the banking industry, and Bi equals one if individual
i is black. The impact of deregulation on competition within the banking industry was
immediate, as shown by Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) and Black and Strahan (2001),
so we use a simple zero-one dummy variable to indicate before and after deregulation.6
Since blacks￿relative wages might vary across states, industries, and time for reasons
other than bank deregulation, we account for other possible factors. Speci￿cally, we
introduce a set of black-state-year ￿xed e⁄ects (￿B;s;t), bank￿ black-year ￿xed e⁄ects
(￿BNK;B;t), and bank-black-state ￿xed e⁄ects (￿BNK;B;s).
The parameter of interest is the coe¢ cient (￿) on the triple interaction term (Dst ￿
BNKi￿Bi). This regression coe¢ cient measures the change in the mean residual wages
of black workers in the banking industry relative to the change in the mean residual
wages of black workers in all other sectors of the economy following bank deregulation.
Table 2 shows the results from estimating equation (6) for the full sample of states,
and when distinguishing between high and low racial bias states, i.e., states that have
above and below the median levels of the racial bias index. When splitting the sample
by racial bias, we allow all of the coe¢ cients, including the black-bank-year e⁄ects to
di⁄er across these two samples.
When not distinguishing states by measures of racial bias and simply estimating
equation (6) for the full sample of states, we do not observe a statistically signi￿cant
relationship between deregulation and blacks￿relative wages. Column (1) provides the
results for the full sample of states, imposing a common e⁄ect of bank deregulation on
the residual wages of black workers in the banking sector across high and low racial bias
states. We ￿nd a positive, though statistically insigni￿cant e⁄ect of 0.16 log points,
which is of similar magnitude to that found in Black and Strahan￿ s (2001) study of
how women￿ s wages within banking responded to bank deregulation.
By di⁄erentiating states by racial bias, we are able to draw sharper inferences:
6Black and Strahan (2001) also use a zero-one dummy variable in their examination of deregulation
and women￿ s relative wages within banking. Thus, we report our results using their estimation period,
which covers the period 1976-1996, though we obtain virtually identical results when using the 1976-
2006 period. As emphasized, our work is di⁄erent. We examine blacks￿relative wages, distinguish
between high and low racial bias states, use more re￿ned ￿xed e⁄ects, and later examine the rami-
￿cations of deregulation￿ and most importantly competition as measured by new ￿rms entry￿ on the
aggregate economy, not just among the few black workers within the banking industry. Furthermore,
our results hold when also including the Intrastate deregulation index.
16bank deregulation is associated with an increase in blacks￿relative wages only in high
racial bias states. When splitting the sample between states with below and above the
median values of the racial bias index (columns (2) and (3)), we ￿nd that deregulation
boosted blacks￿relative wages exactly where the intuition of the taste based theory
of discrimination predicts it will: in economies where there is a substantial "taste
for discrimination." And, deregulation did not boost blacks￿relative wages exactly
where the taste based approach suggests it would not: in low racial bias states.7 This
conclusion is further supported by the results in column (4). There, we include all of the
states together and employ a quadruple interaction term involving bank deregulation, a
banking industry dummy, a race dummy, and the racial bias dummy. Again, the results
indicate that bank deregulation boosted blacks￿ relative wages within the banking
industry, but only within high racial states.
In high racial bias states, the estimated impact of bank deregulation on blacks￿rel-
ative wages within the banking sector is economically large. Indeed, the point estimate
is implausibly large. The estimated coe¢ cient indicates that blacks￿relative wages rise
58 percentage points after deregulation in high racial bias states. While acknowledging
the large coe¢ cient, it is also worth noting that more plausible e⁄ects, such as an 18%
increase in blacks￿relative wages, are within two standard deviations of the estimated
coe¢ cient, ￿, on the triple interaction term. Furthermore, we have thus far ignored
the impact of bank deregulation on the skill composition of black and white workers. If
bank deregulation by a state attracts black workers with better unobserved skills into
a state￿ s banking industry, then our estimates will overstate the impact of deregulation
on blacks￿relative wages. Below, when examining the entire economy, we show that
such selection biases do not a⁄ect the magnitude of our ￿ndings.
While illustrative, these banking industry analyses have statistical and conceptual
limitations. Statistically, the estimates in Table 2 are based on an exceedingly small
number of black workers within the banking industry. For instance, in some years, our
sample only includes about 100 black workers in the banking industry. Conceptually,
banking is a very unique service sector, in which legal barriers formed an extreme barrier
to competition over many decades that created huge rents. Thus, the banking sector
is not necessarily "a representative industry" for assessing the impact of competition
7To be precise, Becker (1957) explicitly recognized that one could construct joint distributions of the
quality and racial prejudices of existing￿ and shadow￿ employers such that an increase in competition
will not boost blacks￿relative wages. We simply observe that the typical articulation of the taste-based
model suggests that an intensi￿cation of competition reduces the manifestation of racial prejudices in
labor markets. And, we empirically assess this prediction.
17on racial wage discrimination.
It would be valuable, therefore, to examine the impact of an exogenous intensi￿-
cation of competition on the manifestation of racial prejudices within a broader array
of industries. As a further motivation for adopting a broader approach and as em-
phasized in the Introduction, Ashenfelter and Hannan (1986) question the value of
industry-speci￿c studies of the racial wage gap when labor is highly mobile across
industries and recommend examining more industries and sectors of the economy.
3.3 Bank Deregulation and Blacks￿Relative Wages: Manufacturing
We now examine manufacturing industries. Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) show that
bank deregulation had an especially positive e⁄ect on competition among ￿rms within
those manufacturing industries that are naturally heavy users of bank ￿nance, i.e.,
bank-dependent industries. Thus, we exploit the di⁄erential impact of bank deregu-
lation on competition across manufacturing industries. Using Cetorelli and Strahan￿ s
(2006) sample period and measure of bank dependence, we assess whether the impact
of deregulation on blacks￿relative wages varies positively with the degree of bank-
dependence of the worker￿ s manufacturing industry.
We again use a modi￿ed version of the residual wage gap (Rist) from equation
(4) as the dependent variable. To compute the residual wage gap, we estimate a
Mincerian wage equation for white workers, separately for each year, while including
(a) state ￿xed e⁄ects, (b) a dummy variable that equals one if the worker is employed
within a manufacturing sector, and (c) a dummy variable that equals one if the worker
is employed within a bank-dependent manufacturing industry, i.e., a manufacturing
industry with above the median bank-dependence. Thus, by construction, the residual
wage gap for white workers sums to zero (a) within a state-year, (b) within and outside
of manufacturing industries by year, and (c) within and outside of bank-dependent
industries by year.
This means that the residual wage gap already controls for any possible e⁄ect of
bank deregulation on the wages of white workers across states and time, between man-
ufacturing and nonmanufacturing industries, and between high bank-dependent and
low bank-dependent manufacturing industries. This helps in isolating the relationship
between bank deregulation and the residual wages of black workers within high and
low bank-dependent industries.
Thus, we estimate the impact of bank deregulation on the racial wage gap only
across manufacturing industries using the following equation:
18Rist = ￿[Dst ￿ BDi ￿ Bi] + ￿BD;B;s + ￿B;s;t + ￿ist; (7)
where Dst equals one when state s in year t has deregulated interstate banking, BDi
equals one if individual i works in a bank-dependent manufacturing industry, and
Bi equals one if individual i is black. Since several factors besides bank deregulation
could in￿ uence blacks￿relative wages within bank-dependent manufacturing industries,
equation (7) introduces an array of ￿xed e⁄ects: ￿BD;B;s is a vector of bank￿ dependent-
black-year ￿xed e⁄ects and ￿B;s;t is a vector of black-state-year ￿xed e⁄ects.
The parameter of interest (￿), the coe¢ cient on the triple interaction term (Dst ￿
BDi ￿ Bi), measures the change in the mean residual wages of black workers within
a state￿ s bank-dependent manufacturing industries relative to changes in the mean
residual wages of black workers within other manufacturing industries in that state
following bank deregulation. This speci￿cation allows (1) the relative wages of black
workers within bank dependent manufacturing industries to vary di⁄erentially from
white workers across states, and (2) the relative wages of black workers within manu-
facturing to vary di⁄erentially from corresponding white workers by state and time.
The Table 3 results show that bank deregulation decreased the racial wage gap
in bank-dependent manufacturing industries relative to the racial wage gap in other
manufacturing industries but only within high racial bias states. When the sample
includes all of the states and we do not di⁄erentiate by racial bias (column 1), the
triple interaction term enters positively and signi￿cantly: blacks￿relative wages rise in
bank-dependent manufacturing industries after bank regulation. Further inspection,
however, demonstrates that this result re￿ ects the impact of competition on blacks￿
relative wages within high racial bias states.
The analyses again stress the importance of di⁄erentiating states by taste for dis-
crimination. Columns (3) and (4) show that bank deregulation only boosted blacks￿
relative wages in bank-dependent industries within high racial bias states. Within low
racial bias states, bank deregulation has no e⁄ect on blacks￿relative wages, regardless
of which manufacturing industry employs the worker. The regression presented in col-
umn (2) shows that the results hold when using an interaction term to di⁄erentiate
among high and low racial bias states instead of splitting the sample.8
So far, the analyses have allowed blacks￿relative wages within manufacturing to
vary by state over time. But, we have not yet allowed blacks￿relative wages within
8The results are robust to conducting the estimation over the longer sample period, from 1976 -
2006, and to including Intrastate deregulation in the regression.
19bank dependent manufacturing industries to vary by state over time relative to blacks￿
relative wages within other manufacturing industries. We do this in column (5) by in-
cluding bank-dependent￿ black-year ￿xed e⁄ects and employing a quadruple interaction
term based on dummy variables for bank deregulation, bank-dependent manufacturing
industries, race, and the state-speci￿c racial bias indicator. As shown, the results hold
and there is essentially no change in the estimated coe¢ cient.
Thus, bank deregulation boosted blacks￿relative wages only where the taste-based
approach to racial discrimination suggests it should: in states where there is a strong
taste for discrimination (high racial bias states) and in industries where deregulation
had a big e⁄ect on competition (bank-dependent industries). And, bank deregulation
did not close the racial gap where the taste based approach suggests it would not: in
low racial bias states and in manufacturing industries that do not receive much of a
spur to competition from bank deregulation.
The estimated impact is large. In high racial bias states, deregulation was associ-
ated with an increase in blacks￿relative wages of about 10% within bank-dependent
manufacturing industries, implying a halving of the racial wage gap.
Di⁄erentiating states by measures of racial bias is crucial for drawing accurate in-
ferences. One might argue that bank deregulation increased the relative wages of black
workers within bank-dependent industries through a mechanism other than competi-
tion. But, it is di¢ cult to explain why bank deregulation increased the relative wages of
black workers only in bank-dependent industries within high racial bias states, without
turning to the intuition underlying the taste based theory of racial discrimination.
3.4 Deregulation and Blacks￿Relative Wages: Entire Economy
While these studies of the banking and manufacturing industries provide valuable in-
formation, there are at least four reasons for examining the entire economy. First, if
there are few barriers to workers moving from the banking industry to the rest of the
economy or a high degree of labor mobility among manufacturing industries within a
state, then it is worthwhile examining relative wages in the state￿ s overall economy,
not simply in a subset of industries.
Second, by examining the entire economy, we can assess whether bank deregulation
reduced the racial wage gap by spurring the entry of new ￿rms, as suggested by taste
based theories of discrimination. Black and Strahan (2002) and Kerr and Nanda (2009)
show that state bank deregulation reduced entry barriers and increased new ￿rm for-
mation. We test whether deregulation boosted blacks￿relative wages by accelerating
20new ￿rm entry. While the earlier manufacturing level analyses allowed us to compare
industries within a state, examining the entire state economy provides information on
a possible mechanism￿ new ￿rm entry￿ linking bank deregulation and the racial wage
gap.9
Third and related, we evaluate the dynamic relationships among bank deregulation,
new ￿rm entry, and the racial wage gap. This provides an opportunity to distinguish
between the e⁄ects of deregulation on the racial wage gap and other trends that might
a⁄ect blacks￿relative wages. Furthermore, as we show, the impact of deregulation on
new ￿rm entry emerges over time. If deregulation is boosting black￿ s relative wages by
lowering entry barriers and fostering the entry of new ￿rms, then we should ￿nd that
the impact of deregulation on the racial wage gap also emerges over time.
Fourth, we have a unique opportunity to assess the broader rami￿cations of a better
functioning ￿nancial system on labor markets. Past work shows that bank deregulation
triggered an intensi￿cation of competition throughout many segments of the economy,
not just in banking and manufacturing. Consequently, we focus the remainder of
our analyses on assessing the impact of competition on the relative demand for black
workers in the entire economy.
3.4.1 Reduced Form Analyses of Bank Deregulation and Blacks￿Relative Wages in
the Entire Economy
Our examination of blacks￿relative wages in the entire economy proceeds in two parts.
In this subsection, we assess the reduced form relationship between bank deregulation
and the racial wage gap￿ both by using the types of regressions employed thus far and
by assessing the dynamic relation between deregulation and blacks￿relative wages. In
the next subsection, we use two-stage least squares to evaluate the impact of new ￿rm
entry on the racial wage gap.
We assess the reduced form impact of bank deregulation on the relative wage rates
of black workers using three speci￿cations. First, blacks￿relative wages are regressed
on bank deregulation using the full sample. Second, we add an interaction term of
deregulation and the racial bias dummy for each state. Third, we split the sample by
the median value of the racial bias index, which allows the coe¢ cients on state and year
￿xed e⁄ects to di⁄er across the subsamples. Throughout, we include state and year
￿xed e⁄ects. We examine each form of deregulation ￿Interstate and Intrastate.10
9These data are unavailable at the industry level for our sample period.
10As noted above, the earlier results hold when including both forms of bank deregulation. We
21Table 4 shows that bank deregulation boosted the relative wage rates of black work-
ers only in high racial bias states. By showing that bank deregulation only increased
blacks￿relative wages in high racial bias states, we reduce concerns that some con-
founding factor both reduces racial discrimination and just happens to be coincident
with the state-speci￿c timing of bank deregulation.
The estimated reduction in the racial wage gap from bank deregulation is economi-
cally meaningful. Consider column (4), which provides the regression results for states
with above the median value of the racial bias index. Deregulation boosted the wage
rates of black workers by 6 percentage points more than their white counterparts after
￿ve years (6 = 0:012 ￿ 5 ￿ 100). Since the average racial wage gap in these high-bias
states was 21 percent in 1976, the results suggest that interstate deregulation elimi-
nates almost one-third of the initial racial wage gap. The results are virtually identical
when using Intrastate, as shown in column (8).
3.4.2 Dynamic Analyses of Deregulation and Blacks￿Relative Wages: Entire
Economy
We now extend these analyses by examining the dynamic relationship between deregu-
lation and blacks￿relative wages. In Figure 2, we trace out the year-by-year relationship
between deregulation and the racial wage gap by estimating the following equation:
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where D￿j equals one for the jth year before deregulation, and D+k equals one for
the kth year after deregulation. These dummy variables equal zero in other years. The
year of deregulation is omitted and the regressions include state (￿s) and year (￿t) ￿xed
e⁄ects. Equation (8) is estimated separately for inter- and intrastate deregulation.11
Panel A includes states with above the median values of the racial bias index and Panel
B includes low racial bias states.
There are three crucial messages. First, the impact of both interstate and intrastate
bank deregulation on blacks￿relative wages is much greater in states where the racial
employ both types in assessing the entire economy to illustrate the robustness of the results, enhance
the dynamic analyses, and overidentify the two-stage least squares regressions.
11Before plotting the estimates, we detrend the series as follows. We compute the trend in the
coe¢ cients on the dummy variables on bank deregulation prior to deregulation. We then detrend
the entire series of estimated coe¢ cients based on the pre-deregulation trend. The resulting ￿gure
illustrates the level and trend of blacks￿relative wages after bank deregulation relative to the patterns
before deregulation.
22bias index is above the median than in states with lower values of the racial bias index.
Second, there is no evidence that trends or innovations in the wage gap precede either
interstate or intrastate bank deregulation. Rather, blacks￿relative wages rise after
bank deregulation in states with high values of the racial bias index. Third, the impact
of deregulation on black￿ s relative wages grows over time.
3.5 Bank Deregulation, New Firm Entry, and Blacks￿Relative Wages
While the reduced form and dynamic analyses demonstrate the powerful impact of
bank deregulation on the racial wage gap, they do not provide direct evidence on the
mechanism linking bank deregulation and blacks￿relative wages. We now examine the
relationship between the rate of new incorporations and blacks￿relative wages to assess
whether, and under which conditions, bank deregulation triggers an increase in the rate
of new incorporations that in turn reduces the racial wage gap. Thus, we use bank
deregulation as an instrument for the rate of new incorporations and assess its impact
on blacks￿relative wages, distinguishing between high and low racial bias states.
3.5.1 The Structure of the 2SLS Analyses
To obtain a consistent estimate of the impact of the rate of new incorporations in each
state and year (Nst) on relative wages, we need a valid instrumental variable. It is
important to instrument for competition because blacks￿relative wages could a⁄ect
the actual entry of ￿rms. For example, ￿rms could enter to exploit the opportunity to
hire less expensive labor in states with a large racial wage gap. If this occurs, OLS will
underestimate the causal impact of competition on blacks￿relative wages.
Thus, we employ the following two-stage least squares (2SLS) structure to capture
the causal relationship of interest,
RBst = ￿0Nst + ￿s + ￿t + ￿ist; (9)
where the predicted value of the rate of new ￿rm entry is obtained from the ￿rst stage
regression using bank deregulation as an instrument:
Nst = D
0
st￿0 + ￿s + ￿t + ￿st; (10)
where Dst is a vector indicating years since bank deregulation, ￿s and ￿s are state-
speci￿c e⁄ects, ￿t and ￿t represent year e⁄ects, ￿ist is an error term composed of a
person speci￿c idiosyncratic shock to relative wages and any unobserved state-year
23￿xed e⁄ects, and ￿st is an error term.12 The standard errors are clustered at the state-
year level throughout the analyses. The parameter of interest, ￿0, is the estimated
impact of competition on the relative wage rates of black workers.
We assess whether the impact of new ￿rm entry on the racial wage gap depends on
the degree to which states have a stronger or weaker taste for discrimination. We do this
both by splitting the sample by the racial bias index and by including an additional
interaction term (the interaction between the racial bias index and the competition
measure (Nst)) in equation (9).
This estimation strategy allows us to relax the standard 2SLS exclusion restriction
that bank deregulation only a⁄ects blacks￿relative wages through its impact on the
rate of new incorporations. By including state and year ￿xed e⁄ects and separately
analyzing states with above and below the median value of the racial bias index, we
assess the di⁄erential impact of an increase in the rate of new incorporations on blacks￿
relative wages in high and low racial bias states. To obtain a consistent estimate of
the di⁄erential impact using 2SLS, we simply require that any bias arising from bank
deregulation a⁄ecting blacks￿relative wages beyond its impact through the rate of new
incorporations is the same in high and low racial bias states.13
3.5.2 Preliminary Analyses of Competition and Blacks￿Relative Wages
Our 2SLS strategy requires that bank deregulation increases the rate of new incorpora-
tions in the overall economy. Table 5 shows that both interstate bank deregulation and
intrastate branch deregulation exert a strong, positive impact on the log of new incor-
porations per capita over time. In columns (1) ￿ (3), we use simple dummy variables
that equal zero before a state deregulates and one afterwards. Interstate deregulation
enters signi￿cantly and positively, but intrastate does not, which is consistent with the
￿ndings in Black and Strahan (2002).
The Table 5 results emphasize that the impact of deregulation on the rate of new in-
12The ￿rst stage regression is conducted at the individual level, so it is weighted by the proportion
of black workers in each state.
13To see this explicitly for the 2SLS speci￿cation, ￿rst consider a simple version of equation (9)
for the racial wage gap: R = ￿N + "; where N (new incorporations) is instrumented with D (bank
deregulation). Ef￿
2SLSg = ￿; if the standard exclusion restriction holds, i.e., if Ef D
0￿
D0Ng = 0:
However, if Ef D
0￿
D0Ng 6= 0; 2SLS produces a biased estimate of ￿, such that Ef￿
2SLSg = ￿ +Ef D
0￿
D0Ng:
Next, recognize that we estimate this system separately for high and low racial bias states to
compute the di⁄erential impact of N on R in high (￿H) and low (￿L) racial bias states respectively.
To compute an unbiased estimate of ￿H ￿￿L, however, we no longer require the standard exclusion
restriction that Ef D
0￿



















24corporations grows over time. In columns (4)￿(6), we include the number of years since
deregulation and its quadratic. Interstate and Intrastate equal the number of years
since interstate and intrastate bank deregulation respectively, and equal zero before
deregulation. Both linear terms enter positively and signi￿cantly, while the quadratic
terms are negative but small. The coe¢ cients in columns (4) and (5) indicate that
￿ve years after either inter- or intrastate deregulation the rate of new incorporations is
about 10 percent greater than before deregulation. Simultaneously deregulating inter-
and intrastate restrictions boosts the rate of new incorporations by 18 percent after ￿ve
years as shown in column (6). The impact of each form of deregulation on competition
grows, reaching a maximum about a decade after interstate deregulation, and over two
decades after intrastate deregulation.
Figure 3 more fully illustrates the positive, dynamic impact of both interstate and
intrastate deregulation on the rate of new incorporations. We trace out the year-by-year
relationship between both interstate and intrastate deregulation and the logarithm of
new incorporations. We do this for two samples of states, those with above the median
level of the racial bias index and those with below median levels. Speci￿cally, we report
estimated coe¢ cients from the following regression:
Nst = ￿+￿1Inter￿9+:::+￿18Inter+9+￿1Intra￿9+:::+￿18Intra+9+￿s+￿t+"st; (11)
where Inter￿j equals one for the jth year before interstate deregulation, and Inter+k
equals one for the kth year after interstate deregulation, while Intra￿j equals one for
the jth year before intrastate deregulation, and Intra+k equals one for the kth year
after intrastate deregulation. These dummy variables equal zero in other years. We
present results starting 9 years before each form of bank deregulation and trace out the
year-by-year dynamics of the relationship between deregulation and the wage gap until
9 years after each type of bank deregulation. The year of deregulation is omitted and
the regressions include state and year ￿xed e⁄ects. Figure 3 illustrates the level and
trend of the logarithm of new incorporations following each type of bank deregulation
relative to the level and trend before deregulation.14
Besides illustrating that bank deregulation boosted the rate of new incorporations,
Figure 3 provides two insights. First, consistent with the results from Figure 2, the
impact of bank deregulation on the rate of new incorporations grows over time. Specif-
ically, if bank deregulation reduced blacks￿relative wages by spurring new ￿rm entry,
14Note, we use the same detrending procedure employed to construct Figure 2.
25then we should observe that the dynamic impact of deregulation on new incorporations
(Figure 3) should coincide with the dynamic impact of deregulation on the racial wage
gap (Figure 2). This is exactly what we ￿nd.
Second, the positive impact of bank deregulation on the rate of new incorpora-
tions occurs in both high and low racial bias states, though the marginal impact of
intrastate deregulation on the rate of new incorporations in low racial bias states is less
pronounced than in high racial bias states. Though the impact of bank deregulation on
new incorporations does not have to be identical in high and low racial bias states, this
part of our analyses focused on the overall economy requires that deregulation boosts
the rate of new incorporations in both high and low racial bias states. This is what
we ￿nd. Moreover, when we restrict our analyses to interstate deregulation, which has
the same impact on the rate of new incorporations in high and low racial bias states,
we con￿rm the results reported below.
As a ￿nal set of preliminary observations, consider the OLS regressions between new
incorporations and the racial wage gap. In columns (1) - (3) of Table 6, the dependent
variable is blacks￿relative wages and the key regressor is the log of new incorporations
per capita. In Panel A, we use the benchmark measure of blacks￿relative wages,
which conditions on the standard Mincerian characteristics, education and potential
work experience. In Panel B, we con￿rm the ￿ndings when also conditioning on each
worker￿ s occupation.
There is a strong, positive association between the rate of new incorporations and
blacks￿relative wages in states with above the median values of the racial bias index
(column 3). A ten percent increase in the rate of new incorporations is associated with
a 1.4 percent increase in blacks￿relative wages in high racial bias states, but not in
states with low values of the racial bias index (column 2).
3.5.3 Competition and Blacks￿Relative Wages: 2SLS
The ￿nal six columns of Panel A and Panel B of Table 6 report 2SLS estimates,
where we use two di⁄erent sets of instrumental variables to identify changes in the
rate of new incorporations. First, the "linear" instruments include Interstate and
Intrastate. Second, the "Non-Parametric" instruments included dummy variables for
each year before and after both types of deregulation. Robustness tests indicate that
using Interstate and Intrastate plus their quadratic terms as instruments produces
similar results.
As shown, the instrumental variables pass the validity tests. They signi￿cantly
26explain new incorporations as shown by the F-test of the excluded instruments. Fur-
thermore, the instruments pass the test of the over-identifying restrictions (OIR test),
meaning that the hypothesis that the instruments only a⁄ect blacks￿relative wages
through their e⁄ect on new incorporations is not rejected.15
The exogenous increase in the rate of new incorporations dramatically boosted the
wage rates of black workers relative to their white counterparts in states with above
the median values of the racial bias index. As reported in both Panels A and B, an
acceleration of the rate of new incorporations increased blacks￿relative wages only in
high racial bias states.
The economic impact is large in states with above the median level of the racial bias
index. A ten percent acceleration in the rate of new incorporations increases blacks￿
relative wages by about 2.5 percent in high racial bias states.16 Combining these results
with those in Figure 3, the results suggest that bank deregulation boosted the rate of
new incorporations by over 20% after ￿ve years in high racial bias states, which in turn
increased blacks￿relative wages by about ￿ve percent in these same states. By spurring
new ￿rm entry, bank deregulation boosted blacks￿relative wages by one-quarter of the
initial racial wage gap in these states, which equaled, on average, 20 percent in the
years before bank deregulation.
3.5.4 Competition and Blacks￿Relative Wages: Sensitivity Analyses
The results are robust to using either the Charles and Guryan (2008) measure of racial
prejudices (CG) or the intermarriage racial bias index (LLR) to categorize states as
high- or low-racial bias states. Table 7 presents the OLS and 2SLS analyses of the
relation between the racial wage gap and the rate of new incorporations. We use
the linear instrument set and compute blacks￿relative wages conditional on standard
Mincerian traits and occupation. We use a common sample of states that is slightly
smaller than in Table 6 because the CG measure is unavailable for Hawaii, Idaho,
Maine, Nebraska, Nevada, and New Mexico. The results hold. In states with above
15In unreported robustness tests, we also show that the results are not driven by states in which
deregulation did not induce an increase in competition, which would run counter to theory and our
identi￿cation strategy. Thus, we run the ￿rst-stage regression while omitting each state one-at-a-
time. We then ￿nd which states are "￿ attening" the estimated relationship between competition and
deregulation in the ￿rst stage. When we eliminate these states, the results strengthen. This robustness
test suggests that the e⁄ects of deregulation on racial discrimination are driven by states in which the
"treatment" is a⁄ecting product market competition, not by some spurious channel.
16The 2SLS parameter estimate is larger than the OLS estimate. This is consistent with the reverse
causality argument made above: if ￿rms are attracted to states where blacks￿relative wages are low,
OLS will underestimate the impact of competition on blacks￿relative wages.
27the median values of the two racial bias indicators, the log of new incorporations per
capita is positively associated with blacks￿relative wages.
Figure 4 shows that the results are robust to considering the full range of possible
combinations of (1) estimation strategy (OLS and 2SLS), (2) method for computing
blacks￿relative wages (either conditioning on standard Mincerian controls (R) or also
conditioning on occupation (Ro)), (3) categorizing states by taste for discrimination
(LLR or CG), and (4) using linear or non-parametric instrumental variables (Linear
or Non ￿ param:). Figure 4 plots each point estimate along with its 95% con￿dence
interval. In terms of the instrumental variable results, there is only one speci￿cation in
which the rate of new incorporation does not enter positively and signi￿cantly at the
￿ve percent level, and instead enters with a p-value of (0:10). This exception involves
using the CG indicator to de￿ne racial attitudes, and we have already discussed the
advantages, in the context of our particular study, of using the intermarriage racial
bias measure (LLR).
3.6 The E⁄ect of Competition on Segregation
3.6.1 Racial Prejudices, Competition, and Segregation
Besides making predictions regarding relative wages, the taste-based theory of discrim-
ination predicts that when employers are heterogeneous in both productive quality and
the "disutility" they receive from employing black workers, there will be segregation
as black workers are hired by the least racially biased employers within any particular
industry. Indeed, if ￿rms are similar in an industry except for the racial prejudices
of employers, segregation will reduce racial wage di⁄erentials as workers simply sort
into equally productive ￿rms according to the racial preferences of employers. This led
Welch (1975) to call the taste-based view a theory of segregation. While racial wage
di⁄erentials are a fundamental measure of labor market discrimination, segregation
o⁄ers an additional margin along which to assess the relationship between competition
and the racial characteristics of labor markets.
From this perspective, lowering entry barriers will allow new employers with less of
a taste for discrimination than existing employers to enter, reducing segregation at the
industry-level. If our earlier results on blacks￿relative wages re￿ ect the causal impact
of intensi￿ed competition on how racial prejudices a⁄ect labor markets, then we should
also observe a reduction in segregation following an intensi￿cation of competition.
283.6.2 The E⁄ect of Competition on Segregation
Consequently, we evaluate the impact of an intensi￿cation of competition on the racial
allocation of workers across industries while di⁄erentiating states by the degree of racial
prejudice. We test whether competition induces black workers to move to historically
"white" industries using data at the 3 digit industry level.
We construct and use several measures of the extent to which an industry is particu-
larly "white." First, we calculate the share of white workers by industry. Second, since
the racial composition of workers in an industry might simply re￿ ect the human capital
needs of the industry in conjunction with the di⁄erential racial composition of human
capital skills, we also estimate the degree to which the proportion of white workers in
an industry is greater than the proportion explained by the underlying characteristics
of workers. To do this, we regress (for each year) the proportion of white workers in
each of the 144 industries on the characteristics of the white workers in that industry,
including education, a quartic in potential experience, as well as occupation and state
￿xed e⁄ects, i.e., the same set of regressors that we employ to generate wage residuals.
We collect the average residuals in each industry. These provide crude and residual
("unexplained") measures of the "whiteness" of each industry. Third, motivated by
Ashenfelter and Hannan (1986), we calculate the proportion of white managers in each
industry and use this proportion as a measure of the degree to which an industry is
dominated by whites. Fourth, we also construct the unexplained proportion of white
managers, using the same conditioning regressors.
We next estimate the impact of competition on the racial composition of the indus-
try in which each black worker is employed. We use the same speci￿cation employed in
our relative wage regressions, except the dependent variable is one of the measures of
the "whiteness" of the industry in which each black works. Thus, we regress industry
whiteness on the log of new incorporations per capita, controlling for state and year
￿xed e⁄ects. We do this using OLS and 2SLS. We divide states by the degree of racial
bias, using both the LLR and CG measures of racial bias to categorize states. Thus,
we evaluate whether an exogenous increase in competition induces black workers to
move to "white" industries, while di⁄erentiating states by racial bias. In the analyses,
we obtain the same results whether we use the crude or residual measures of the de-
gree to which an industry is composed of white workers or managers. For simplicity,
we present the results for the unexplained proportion of white workers and the crude
measure of the fraction of white managers.
Table 8 indicates that an acceleration of the rate of new incorporations in high racial
29bias states induced blacks to work in "whiter" industries. These results hold when
examining (1) the unexplained proportion of white workers and (2) the proportion of
white managers. The results hold when using OLS or 2SLS, and whether we divide
states by the LLR or the CG indicator of racial bias.17
4 Robustness Checks
We conducted an array of additional robustness tests. In this section, we summarize
these brie￿ y and refer interested readers to an extensive Annex with further explana-
tions, tables, and ￿gures that is available on request.
4.1 Mobility between Industries
Perhaps bank deregulation and its impact on the rate of new incorporations induced
a shift of black workers to better paying industries, rather than an increase in blacks￿
relative wages within industries. Thus, we redid the analyses after computing blacks￿
relative wages by conditioning on education, potential experience, occupation, and
industry. We ￿nd that the intensi￿cation of competition boosted blacks￿wages relative
to comparable white workers within the same industry and occupation.
4.2 Relative Hours Worked
We were concerned that blacks￿relative wages could also rise if deregulation induced
the labor supply curve of black males to shift leftward, encouraging the working hours
of blacks to fall after deregulation relative to comparable white workers. But, we ￿nd
that bank deregulation boosted the relative working hours of blacks. The evidence
suggests that deregulation increased the relative demand for black workers.
4.3 Selection, Migration, and Self-Employment
We were concerned that changes in the skill composition of black males in deregulating
states could a⁄ect our evaluation of blacks￿relative wages. Consequently, we calculated
the projected wage rates for all working age (non-institutionalized) blacks in each state,
17We do not reject statistical discrimination explanations of racial wage di⁄erentials (Arrow, 1972;
Phelps, 1972). There is an active literature assessing nature of statistical discrimination (Altonji and
Pierret, 2001; Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua, 2006; Neal and Johnson, 1996). Our work simply shows
that the impact of competition on the relative demand for black workers varies positively with an
economy￿ s taste for discrimination.
30whether they were working or not. We do this using the estimated returns to observable
traits from equation (1) and using the actual traits of each black male. In this way,
we compute the value of observable traits of all black males. Then, we evaluated the
impact of bank deregulation on the composition of skills in the workforce.
We ￿nd that deregulation did not have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on the average value
of the traits of black workers. There is no evidence that deregulation substantively
a⁄ected the skill composition of black workers.
It is also possible that deregulation triggered the selective migration of workers
across states. This could potentially confound our interpretation of the ￿ndings.
Although we ￿nd that the share of black males within a state increased slightly
following deregulation, there were only very minor changes in the skill composition of
working blacks. There is no indication that migration leads us to overstate the impact
of deregulation on the racial wage gap.
Similarly, the boost in blacks￿relative wages could attract black males with com-
paratively low unobserved skills into the labor force, leading us to underestimate the
degree to which the rate of new incorporations reduces racial wage di⁄erentials.
We ￿nd no evidence that selection based on unobservables is causing us to un-
derestimate the true e⁄ect of the rate of new incorporations. While the log of new
incorporations per capita increases the relative demand for black workers, the number
of new black males pulled into the labor force is relatively small, such that median
regressions yield virtually identical results to the OLS estimates.
4.4 Swimming Upstream
Although national trends in returns to unobserved skills will not a⁄ect our results
because we control for year ￿xed e⁄ects, the intensi￿cation of competition when a
state deregulates could increase returns to unobservable traits. If the average white
worker has more of these unobserved traits than the average black worker, we will
underestimate the true, positive e⁄ect of deregulation on the relative wages of blacks.
This is sometimes called ￿swimming upstream￿(Juhn Murphy and Pierce, 1991; Blau
and Kahn, 1997; Blau and Kahn, 2000; and Mulligan and Rubinstein, 2008). To
assess the importance of swimming upstream, we follow the literature and use quantile
regressions. The goal is to compare black and white workers that are more similar in
unobserved skills than when using OLS, which compares averages from both groups.
We con￿rm the existence of swimming upstream. This suggests that we are under-
estimating the bene￿cial e⁄ects of bank deregulation on blacks￿relative wages.
314.5 Race or Poverty?
Since bank deregulation exerted a disproportionately positive impact on the poor and
blacks are on average comparatively poor (Beck, Levine, and Levkov, 2010), the current
paper￿ s analyses could re￿ ect this income distributional e⁄ect, rather than the impact
of competition on the manifestation of racial prejudices in labor markets.
Three observations, however, suggest that this is not the case. First, bank deregu-
lation and the rate of new incorporations boosted blacks￿relative wages only in states
with a high degree of racial bias. Second, the results hold when computing relative
wages conditional on occupation and industry. Third, we performed a rank analysis to
compare the change in blacks￿relative wages with those of comparable whites across
the full distribution of relative wage rates. In contrast to the view that deregulation
is simply helping the poor, we ￿nd that bank deregulation disproportionately helped
black workers across the full distribution of wages.
5 Conclusions
Although Becker￿ s (1957) seminal work has shaped our understanding of discrimination
for over ￿fty years, we provide the ￿rst assessment of a central prediction of the taste-
based theory of discrimination: An intensi￿cation of product market competition will
reduce the black-white wage di⁄erential in economies where employers have su¢ ciently
strong racial prejudices.
In this paper, we ￿nd that an exogenous intensi￿cation of competition substantively
boosted blacks￿relative wages and reduced racial segregation￿ but only in states with
a su¢ ciently high degree of racial bias. In 2SLS, we use bank deregulation to identify
an exogenous intensi￿cation of competition. The resultant increase in competition
eliminated more than one-￿fth of the preexisting black-white wage di⁄erential in high
racial bias states over a ￿ve year period. Consistent with the taste-based theory of racial
discrimination, an increase in product market competition reduced the manifestation
of racial prejudices in labor markets.
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37Table 1 
 THE RACIAL BIAS INDEX, SURVEY MEASURES OF RACIAL PREJUDICE, AND RELATIVE WAGES 
Panel A: Correlation Coefficients Between the Different  
Fraction whites 













Measures of Taste for Discrimination     (1)  (2)  (3) 
Racial bias index 
 
0.36  0.35  0.31 
   
{0.02}  {0.02}  {0.04} 
Observations 
 
43  43  43 
         
   
Panel B: Taste for Discrimination and  Dependent Variable: Relative Wages of Blacks 
Relative Wages of Blacks  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Racial bias index > median  -.079*** 
 




(.014)  (.012) 
Marginal racial prejudice > median 
 
-.058***  -.042***  -.002 
   
(.015)  (.015)  (.017) 
Share of blacks in 1970 ≥ 10% 
     
-.082*** 
       
(.013) 
Observations  10,076   10,076    10,076    10,076   
NOTE – Panel A reports correlation coefficients between (1) The racial bias index, which is based on interracial marriages in 1970, 
and (2) three recent survey-based indicators of racial prejudice from Charles and Guryan (2008). Panel B reports estimated 
coefficients from four regressions, where the dependent variable is blacks’ relative wage rates. Relative wages are conditional on 
five indicators of years of completed education (0-8, 9-11, 12, 13-15, and 16+) and a quartic in potential experience. Estimates are 
weighted by sampling weights provided by the Current Population Survey. In column (1), the regressor is an indicator which 
equals one if the racial bias index above the median and zero otherwise. In column (2) the regressor is an indicator which equals one 
if the marginal racial prejudice above the median and zero otherwise. The marginal racial prejudice index is the pth percentile of the 
distribution of an aggregate index of racial prejudice, where p is the percentile of workforce that is black. The marginal racial 
prejudice index is taken from Charles and Guryan (2008). Column (3) includes simultaneously the regressors from columns (1) and 
(2). In column (4) we also control for an indicator which equals one if the proportion of blacks in the workforce in 1970 is above 
10%. The regressions include black workers prior to interstate and intrastate bank deregulation, so that the reported number of 
observations equals 10,076. All regressions include year fixed effects. We do not include state fixed effects because the regressors are 
fixed for each state and do not change over time. Standard errors are clustered at the state-year level and appear in parentheses; p-
values are in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  
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THE EFFECT OF INTERSTATE DEREGULATION ON BLACKS' RELATIVE WAGES IN THE BANKING 
INDUSTRY 
   
Racial Bias Index 
 
 
All  Below  Above  All 
 
States  Median  Median  States 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Deregulation x Bank x Black  .155  .031  .580***  .031 
 
(.105)  (.112)  (.200)  (.112) 
         
Deregulation x Bank x Black x  
     
.549** 
(Racial Bias Index > median) 
     
(.229) 
         
R2  .040  .035  .044  .041 
Observations  43,697  28,571  15,126  43,697 
NOTE – Data are taken from the March Supplements to the Current Population Survey (CPS) for the calendar years 
1977-1997. The dependent variable in all specifications is the residual wage gap imputed from the difference 
between actual hourly wage (in logs) and the project hourly wages from by-year OLS Mincerian wage regression 
of hourly wages (in logs) on education (6 categories) experience (quartic), education-experience interactions, and 
state-year fixed effects estimated for white males. All specifications control for black-state-year fixed effects, bank-
black-year fixed effects, and bank-black-state fixed effects. The last specification also controls for banking-year-
black-above-median-racial-bias-index fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by state-year-black level 
and appear in parentheses. Estimates are weighted by sampling weights provided by the CPS. ** and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 5% and 1% respectively. 
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THE EFFECT OF INTERSTATE DEREGULATION ON BLACKS' RELATIVE WAGES ACROSS MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 
     
Racial Bias Index 
 
 
All  All  Below  Above  All 
 
States  States  Median  Median  States 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Deregulation x (Manufacturing Bank Dependence > Median) x Black  .049**  .007  .007  .104***  -.055 
 
(.021)  (.028)  (.028)  (.032)  (.062) 
(Deregulation x (Manufacturing Bank Dependence > Median) x Black) x 
 
.096** 
   
.092** 
(Racial Bias Index > median) 
 
(.043) 
   
(.042) 
           
Fixed Effects: 
         
(Manufacturing Bank Dependence > Median)-Black-State-Year 
       
Yes 
           
R2  .115  .116  .113  .112  .119 
Observations  11,403  11,403  6,522  4,881  11,403 
NOTE – Data are taken from the March Supplements to the Current Population Survey (CPS) for the calendar years 1977-1997. The dependent variable in all 
specifications is the residual wage gap imputed from the difference between actual hourly wage (in logs) and the project hourly wages from by-year OLS 
Mincerian wage regression of hourly wages (in logs) on education (6 categories) experience (quartic), education-experience interactions, and state-year fixed 
effects estimated for white males. Bank dependence equals the share of assets financed with debt and is taken from Cetorelli and Strahan (2006). All 
specifications control for black-state-year fixed effects. The last specification controls for (manufacturing bank dependence > median)-black-state-year fixed 
effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by state-year-black level and appear in parentheses. Estimates are weighted by sampling weights provided by 
the CPS. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Racial Bias Index: 
       
















Median  Median 
   (1)  (2)     (3)  (4)     (5)  (6)     (7)  (8) 
Years since deregulation  .001  .004 
 
.003  .012* 
 
.005***  .005*** 
 
.004***  .011*** 
 
(.003)  (.003) 
 
(.003)  (.007) 
 
(.001)  (.001) 
 
(.002)  (.002) 
(Years since deregulation) x 
 
.003*** 
         
.004*** 
     
(Racial bias index > median) 
 
(.001) 
         
(.001) 
     
                       
Impact after five years  .006  .037** 
 
.013  .061* 
 
.023***  .044*** 
 
.022***  .057*** 
 
(.015)  (.016) 
 
(.016)  (.034) 
 
(.006)  (.007) 
 
(.007)  (.012) 
Impact after five years 
                     
as a share of sample's initial wage gap  3%  21% 
 
9%  29% 
 
13%  25% 
 
15%  27% 
                       
Observations  73,801  73,801     48,367  25,434     73,801  73,801     48,367  25,434 
NOTE - The dependent variable is the relative wage rates of blacks. Relative wages are conditional on five indicators of years of completed education (0-8, 
9-11, 12, 13-15, and 16+) and a quartic in potential experience. Estimates are weighted by sampling weights provided by the Current Population Survey. 
Standard errors are adjusted for state-year clustering and appear in parentheses. All regressions include state and year fixed effects. The reported number 
of observations is for blacks only. Details about sample construction are in Appendix Table 2. In columns (1)-(4), “years since deregulation” stands for 
years since interstate deregulation; in columns (5)-(8), “years since deregulation” stands for years since intrastate deregulation. In columns (2) and (6), 
years since deregulation is interacted with an indicator which equals one if the racial bias index is above the median and zero otherwise. In columns (1), 
(2), (5), and (6) we include the entire sample. In columns (3) and (7) we include only states with racial bias index below the median. In columns (4) and (8) 
we include only states with racial bias index above the median. The racial bias index is based on rate of interracial marriages using the 1970 Census of 
Population. Appendix Table 3 lists the racial bias index for each state. The average initial racial wage gap is 17% for all states, 15% for states with a racial 




BANK DEREGULATION AND LOG NEW INCORPORATIONS PER CAPITA 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Interstate dummy  .084*** 
 
.082** 





     
Intrastate dummy 
 
.040  .038 
     
   
(.041)  (.041) 
     
Interstate 


















       
.021***  .019** 
         
(.008)  (.008) 
Intrastate squared 
       
-.0004*  -.0004* 
         
(.0002)  (.0002) 
             
Observations  882  882  882  882  882  882 
NOTE – The table shows the impact of various measures of bank deregulation on log new incorporations 
per capita. Robust standard errors are adjusted for state-level clustering and appear in parentheses. 
Intrastate dummy equals one in the years after a state permits branching via mergers and acquisitions 
and zero otherwise. Interstate dummy equals one in the years after a state permits interstate banking and 
zero otherwise. Interstate  is equal to years since interstate deregulation and is equal to zero before 
interstate deregulation. Intrastate is equal to years since intrastate deregulation and is equal to zero before 
intrastate deregulation. New incorporations are from Dun and Bradstreet. Dates of intrastate and 
interstate bank deregulations are from Kroszner and Strahan (1999) and Amel (2008). The sample is for 
the years 1977-1994 and excludes Delaware and South Dakota. All regressions include state and year 











   
Racial Bias Index: 
   
Racial Bias Index: 
   
Racial Bias Index: 
 
All  Below  Above 
 
All  Below  Above 
 
All  Below  Above 
 
States  Median  Median 
 
States  Median  Median 
 
States  Median  Median 
   (1)  (2)  (3)     (4)  (5)  (6)     (7)  (8)  (9) 
Panel A: Relative Wage Rates are Conditional on Education and Potential Experience 
       
Log new incorporation per capita  .018  -.038  .137*** 
 
.042  -.080  .267*** 
 
.019  -.122**  .235*** 
 
(.022)  (.023)  (.038) 
 
(.064)  (.071)  (.071) 
 
(.048)  (.054)  (.062) 
F-test of excluded instruments 
       
21.8  8.2  26.8 
 
3.0  2.3  113.5 
OIR test (p-value) 
       
.003  .174  .134 
 
.608  .518  .086 
Observations  37,876  24,754  13,122 
 
37,876  24,754  13,122 
 
37,876  24,754  13,122 
                       
Panel B: Relative Wage Rates are Conditional on Education, Potential Experience, and Occupation 
   
Log new incorporation per capita  .016  -.029  .122*** 
 
.023  -.026  .214*** 
 
.020  -.079  .198*** 
 
(.020)  (.023)  (.037) 
 
(.064)  (.071)  (.068) 
 
(.046)  (.053)  (.058) 
F-test of excluded instruments 
       
21.8  8.2  26.8 
 
3.0  2.3  113.5 
OIR test (p-value) 
       
.046  .358  .123 
 
.845  .683  .082 
Observations  37,876  24,754  13,122 
 
37,876  24,754  13,122 
 
37,876  24,754  13,122 
NOTE - The dependent variable is the relative wage rates of blacks. In panel A, relative wages are conditional on five indicators of years of completed 
education (0-8, 9-11, 12, 13-15, and 16+) and a quartic in potential experience. In panel B, relative wages are conditional on five indicators of years of 
completed education (0-8, 9-11, 12, 13-15, and 16+), a quartic in potential experience, and occupation fixed effects. Estimates are weighted by sampling 
weights provided by the Current Population Survey. Standard errors are adjusted for state-year clustering and appear in parentheses. All regressions 
include state and year fixed effects. The reported number of observations is for blacks only. Details about sample construction are in Appendix Table 2. 
The sample is limited to the years 1977-1994 due to availability of log new incorporations per capita data. In columns (1), (4), and (7) we include the 
entire sample. In columns (2), (5), and (8) we include only states with racial bias index below the median. In columns (3), (6), and (9) we include only 
states with racial bias index above the median. The racial bias index is based on rate of interracial marriages using the 1970 Census of Population. 
Appendix Table 3 lists the racial bias index for each state. Columns (1)-(3) report Ordinary Least Squares estimates of the impact of log new 
incorporations per capita on the relative wage rates of blacks. Columns (4)-(9) report Two Stage Least Squares estimates of the impact of log new 
incorporations per capita on the relative wage rates of blacks. In columns (4)-(6), log new incorporations per capita are instrumented by years since 
interstate deregulation and years since intrastate deregulation. In columns (7)-(9), log new incorporations per capita are instrumented by dummy 
variables for each year before and after interstate deregulation and dummy variables for each year before and after intrastate deregulation. The F-test of 
excluded instruments reports the F-statistic from the first-stage. The OIR test reports the p-value of a J-statistic that test over-identifying restrictions. *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  
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THE IMPACT OF LOG NEW INCORPORATIONS ON THE RELATIVE WAGES OF BLACKS: OLS AND 2SLS ESTIMATES 







Below Median   
Racial Bias 
Above Median   
Racial Bias 




LLR  CG 
 
LLR  CG 
 
LLR  CG 
 
LLR  CG 
   (1)  (2)     (3)  (4)     (5)  (6)     (7)  (8) 
Log new incorporation per capita  -.029  -.029 
 
.124***  .039 
 
-.024  -.051 
 
.224***  .165** 
 
(.023)  (.030) 
 
(.037)  (.028) 
 
(.071)  (.057) 
 
(.068)  (.076) 
                       
F-test of excluded instruments 
           
8.1  32.8 
 
26.8  16.2 
OIR test (p-value) 
           
.375  .264 
 
.259  .571 
Observations  24,272  8,093     12,942  29,121     24,272  8,093     12,942  29,121 
NOTE - The dependent variable is the relative wage rates of blacks. Relative wages are conditional on five indicators of years of 
completed education (0-8, 9-11, 12, 13-15, and 16+), a quartic in potential experience, and occupation fixed effects. Estimates are 
weighted by sampling weights provided by the Current Population Survey. Standard errors are adjusted for state-year clustering 
and appear in parentheses. All regressions include state and year fixed effects. The reported number of observations is for blacks 
only. Details about sample construction are in Appendix Table 2. The sample is limited to the years 1977-1994 due to availability of 
log new incorporations per capita data. “LLR” stands for the racial bias index and is based on rate of interracial marriages using the 
1970 Census of Population. Appendix Table 3 lists the racial bias index for each state. “CG” stands for the marginal racial prejudice 
which is obtained from Charles and Guryan (2008). In columns (1) and (5) we include only states with racial bias index below the 
median. In columns (3) and (7) we include only states with racial bias index above the median. In columns (2) and (6) we include 
only states with marginal racial prejudice below the median. In columns (4) and (8) we include only states with marginal racial 
prejudice above the median. Columns (1)-(4) report Ordinary Least Squares estimates of the impact of log new incorporations per 
capita on the relative wage rates of blacks. Columns (5)-(8) report Two Stage Least Squares estimates of the impact of log new 
incorporations per capita on the relative wage rates of blacks. Log new incorporations per capita are instrumented by dummy 
variables for each year before and after interstate deregulation and dummy variables for each year before and after intrastate 
deregulation. The F-test of excluded instruments reports the F-statistic from the first-stage. The OIR test reports the p-value of a J-
statistic that test over-identifying restrictions. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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working in a white industry 
 


















Below  Above 
 
Below  Above 
 
Below  Above 
 
Below  Above 
 
Median  Median 
 
Median  Median 
 
Median  Median 
 
Median  Median 
   (1)  (2)     (3)  (4)     (5)  (6)     (7)  (8) 
Panel A: Levine-Levkov-Rubinstein Measure of Racial Prejudice 
             
Log new incorporation per capita  .001  .004** 
 
-.001  .012*** 
 
.002  .007*** 
 
-.000  .008* 
 
(.001)  (.002) 
 
(.003)  (.004) 
 
(.002)  (.002) 
 
(.004)  (.004) 
Observations  24,754  13,122 
 
24,754  13,122 
 
24,687  13,064 
 
24,687  13,064 
                       
Panel B: Charles-Guryan Racial Prejudice 
                 
Log new incorporation per capita  .000  .004** 
 
-.001  .007** 
 
.000  .009*** 
 
.000  .015*** 
 
(.002)  (.001) 
 
(.002)  (.003) 
 
(.003)  (.002) 
 
(.003)  (.004) 
Observations  8,093  29,121     8,093  29,121     8,064  29,034     8,064  29,034 
NOTE – The dependent variable in columns (1)-(4) is proportion of “excess” whites in an industry, where the proportion of “excess” whites is the proportion of 
whites that is unexplained by years of completed education (0-8, 9-11, 12, 13-15, and 16+), a quartic in potential experience, and occupation fixed effects. The 
dependent variable in columns (5)-(8) is proportion of white managers in an industry. Estimates are weighted by sampling weights provided by the Current 
Population Survey. Standard errors are adjusted for state-year clustering and appear in parentheses. All regressions include state and year fixed effects. The 
reported number of observations is for blacks only. Details about sample construction are in Appendix Table 2. The sample is limited to the years 1977-1994 due to 
availability of log new incorporations per capita data. In columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) we include only states with racial prejudice below the median. In columns (2), 
(4), (6), and (8) we include only states with racial prejudice above the median. In panel A, racial prejudice is the racial bias index which is based on rate of 
interracial marriages using the 1970 Census of Population. Appendix Table 3 lists the racial bias index for each state. In panel B, racial prejudice is the marginal 
racial prejudice which is obtained from Charles and Guryan (2008). Columns (1), (2), (5), and (6) report Ordinary Least Squares estimates, while columns (3), (4), 
(7), and (8) report Two Stage Least Squares. Log new incorporations per capita are instrumented by dummy variables for each year before and after interstate 
deregulation and dummy variables for each year before and after intrastate deregulation. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
45Appendix Table 1 
RACIAL BIAS INDEX BY STATES, 1970 
States with racial bias index < median    States with racial bias index > median 
State  Racial Bias Index    State  Racial Bias Index 
Alaska  0.00    Arkansas  0.30 
Hawaii  0.07    Virginia  0.30 
Washington  0.10    South Dakota  0.30 
New York  0.11    Colorado  0.30 
Nevada  0.12    North Carolina  0.32 
California  0.15    Texas  0.32 
District of Columbia  0.18    Nebraska  0.32 
Delaware  0.24    Minnesota  0.32 
South Carolina  0.24    Mississippi  0.33 
New Jersey  0.25    Oregon  0.33 
Pennsylvania  0.25    Louisiana  0.33 
Michigan  0.26    Georgia  0.34 
Kentucky  0.26    Oklahoma  0.35 
Illinois  0.26    Indiana  0.35 
Maryland  0.27    Alabama  0.35 
Connecticut  0.27    Wisconsin  0.36 
Rhode island  0.27    Vermont  0.36 
New Mexico  0.27    Utah  0.37 
Kansas  0.28    Idaho  0.37 
Massachusetts  0.28    Tennessee  0.39 
Ohio  0.28    Iowa  0.39 
Missouri  0.28    Montana  0.40 
Arizona  0.29    North Dakota  0.43 
Florida  0.29    West Virginia  0.45 
      Maine  0.45 
      Wyoming  0.46 
         New Hampshire  0.46 
NOTE - The racial bias index is based on inter-racial marriage data obtained from the 1970 Census of Population. The sample 
includes married whites and blacks between that ages of 18 to 65, and excludes couples in which at least one person is living 
in group quarters or has missing data on race, gender, state of residence, marital status, or educational attainment. The racial 
bias index is based on the difference between the estimated rate of inter-racial marriage in 1970, where the estimation is 
based on each state’s racial composition along with each individual’s education and age characteristics, and the actual rate of 
inter-racial marriage. Larger values of the racial bias index signify that the actual rate of inter-racial marriage is 
correspondingly smaller than the estimated rate. 
 
46Figure 1 
TRENDS AND INNOVATIONS IN THE RELATIVE WAGE RATES OF BLACKS PRIOR TO BANK DEREGULATION 
 
NOTE  –  Figures A and B plot the year of bank deregulation against the average black-white wage 
differential prior to deregulation. In Figure A we consider years prior to interstate deregulation. In Figure 
B we consider years prior to intrastate deregulation. Figures C and D plot the year of bank deregulation 
against the change in the black-white wage differential prior to deregulation. In Figure C we consider 
years prior to interstate deregulation. In Figure D we consider years prior to intrastate deregulation. The 
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47Figure 2 
THE IMPACT OF DEREGULATION ON THE RELATIVE WAGE RATES OF BLACKS 
 
NOTE – The figures plot the impact of interstate and intrastate bank deregulations on the relative wage rates of blacks. The upper 
figure is for states with racial bias index above the median. The lower figure is for state with racial bias index below the median. We 
consider a 25 year window, spanning from 10 years before deregulation until 15 years after deregulation. The solid lines represent 
the impact of intrastate deregulation on the relative wage rates of blacks. The dashed lines represent the impact of interstate 
deregulation on the relative wage rates of blacks. Specifically, we report estimated coefficients from the following regression: 
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The D’s equal zero, except as follows: D-j equals one for states in the jth year before deregulation, while D+j equals one for states in 
the jth year after deregulation. We exclude the year of deregulation, thus estimating the dynamic effect of deregulation on the 
relative wage rates of blacks relative to the year of deregulation. We de-trend the coefficients by prior trends and normalize their 
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48Figure 3 
THE IMPACT OF DEREGULATION ON ENTRY OF FIRMS 
 
SOURCES  – Data on new incorporations per capita are taken from Black and Strahan (2002). Dates of intrastate and interstate 
deregulations are taken from Kroszner and Strahan (1999). 
NOTE – The figures plot the impact of interstate and intrastate bank deregulations on log new incorporations per capita. The upper 
figure is for states with racial bias index above the median. The lower figure is for state with racial bias index below the median. We 
consider an 18 years window spanning from 9 years before deregulations until 9 years after deregulations. The solid lines represent 
the impact of intrastate deregulation on log new incorporations per capita. The dashed lines represent the impact of interstate 
deregulation on log new incorporations per capita. Specifically, we report estimated coefficients from the following regression: 
Yst = α + β1Intra-9 + γ1Inter-9 + β2Intra-8 + γ2Inter-8 + … + β18Intra+9 + γ18Inter+9 + δs + δt + εst 
Yst is log new incorporations per capita in state s and year t. Intra-j equals one for states in the jth year before intrastate deregulation 
and equals zero otherwise. Intra+k equals one for states in the kth year after intrastate deregulation and equals zero otherwise. 
Similarly, Inter-j equals one in states in the jth year before interstate deregulation and equals zero otherwise. Inter+k equals one in 
states in the kth year after interstate deregulation and equals zero otherwise. δs and δt are state and year fixed effects, respectively. 
We exclude the year of intrastate and interstate deregulation, thus estimating the dynamic effect of deregulation on log new 
incorporations per capita relative to the corresponding year of deregulation. We de-trend the coefficients by prior trends and 
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49Figure 4 
THE IMPACT OF LOG NEW INCORPORATIONS PER CAPITA ON THE RELATIVE WAGE RATES OF BLACKS 
DIFFERENT OLS AND 2SLS SPECIFICATIONS 
(DASHED LINES REPRESENT 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS) 
 
NOTE – The circles and triangles represent the estimated impact of log new incorporations per capita on the relative wages of blacks. 
The dashed lines represent the corresponding 95% confidence intervals, adjusted for state and year clustering.  The estimated 
coefficients and the confidence intervals are from twelve different specifications. The notation in the specifications is as follows: OLS 
– Ordinary Least Squares; 2SLS Linear – Two-Stage Least Squares with Interstate and Intrastate entering linearly;  2SLS Non-param 
– Two-Stage Least Squares with Interstate and Intrastate entering non-parametrically;  R – relative wages of blacks, where the 
relative wages are conditional on years of completed education and quartic in potential experience; Ro - relative wages of blacks, 
where the relative wages are conditional on years of completed education, a quartic in potential experience, and occupation fixed 
effects; LLR – states with racial bias index above the median; CG – states with marginal racial prejudice (From Charles and Guryan, 
2008) above the median. The different specifications are: (1) OLS, with relative wages conditional on education and experience, in 
states above the median racial bias index, (2) OLS, with relative wages conditional on education, experience, and occupation, in 
states above the median racial bias index, (3) OLS, with relative wages conditional on education and experience, in states above the 
median marginal racial prejudice, (4) OLS, with relative wages conditional on education, experience, and occupation, in states above 
the median marginal racial prejudice, (5) 2SLS with linear instruments, relative wages conditional on education and experience, in 
states above the median racial bias index, (6) 2SLS with linear instruments, relative wages conditional on education, experience, and 
occupation, in states above the median racial bias index, (7) 2SLS with linear instruments, relative wages conditional on education 
and experience, in states above the median marginal racial prejudice, (8) 2SLS with linear instruments, relative wages conditional on 
education, experience, and occupation, in states above  the median marginal racial prejudice, (9) 2SLS with non-parametric 
instruments, relative wages conditional on education and experience, in states above the median racial bias index, (10) 2SLS with 
non-parametric instruments, relative wages conditional on education, experience, and occupation, in states above the median racial 
bias index, (11) 2SLS with non-parametric instruments, relative wages conditional on education and experience, in states above the 
median marginal racial prejudice, (12) 2SLS with non-parametric instruments, relative wages conditional on education, experience, 
and occupation, in states above the median marginal racial prejudice. Measures of marginal racial prejudice are obtained from 


























































(1) OLS, R, LLR
(2) OLS, Ro, LLR
(3) OLS, R, CG
(4) OLS, Ro, CG
(5) 2SLS Linear, R, LLR
(6) 2SLS Linear, Ro, LLR
(7) 2SLS Linear, R, CG
(8) 2SLS Linear, Ro, CG
(9) 2SLS Non-param, R, LLR
(10) 2SLS Non-param, Ro, LLR
(11) 2SLS Non-param, R, CG
(12) 2SLS Non-param, Ro, CG
Specification
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